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The Politics and Ironies 
of Educational Change: 
The Case of Vouchers 
Walter McCann is an Associate Professor and Director of 
the program in administration at the Graduate School of 
Education at Harvard. He was formerly Associate 
Director of the OEO voucher project, which he now 
serves occasionally as a consultant, and is co-author of a 
casebook, Public School Law.Mr. Mccann, a lawyer 
(Harvard, 1963), has taught courses in law and education 
at Harvard. 
Walter Mccann 
Perhaps Rube Goldberg didn't design the American system of education, but he would certainly admire it. Like one of his fabulous 
contraptions, our school systems chug along, always in 
motion, seldom changing much, relatively impervious to 
outside forces. This is particularly true of major urban 
school systems which are generally agreed to be in 
serious trouble financially, organizationally and 
educationally. 
Why is this so? Are the Kozols right? Are school 
systems staffed only by mean-minded civil servants 
lurking in cloistered classrooms, awaiting childish 
misdemeanors so they can take the rod, physical or 
psychological, to hapless children? Surely not, as a 
discussion with decent, intelligent, yet frustrated, 
teachers and administrators in almost any major school 
system will reveal. Is it because, as a former member of 
the Boston School Committee recently argued, schools 
are getting better and better but kids are growing worse 
and worse, implying that virtually the entire responsi-
bility for educational problems lies outside the school 
system? But how can this be when children from 
affluent and poor families, cities and suburbs, voice 
similar complaints about schools? Or is it because we 
starve public education for money and then expect it to 
perform complex tasks with efficiency and imagination? 
While there might be something to this complaint, what 
evidence we have raises serious doubts about the relation 
between more money and better schooling. 1 
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The catalog of excuses is extensive. Whatever one's 
favored explanation, there is wide agreement that 
schools must change. Yet, most people also conclude 
that schools and school systems are not changing much, 
or at least not enough. Those who actively work for it 
testify to the extraordinary difficulty of implementing 
educational change, even when the changes are less 
sweeping than those discussed here.2 
This paper will attempt to contribute to an under-
standing of the forces arrayed aginst educational change. 
The discussion revolves around a proposal to test an 
educational voucher system through a demonstration 
project designed by the Center for the Study of Public 
Policy (CSPP)3 with the backing of the Office of 
Economic Opportunity (OEO) in Washington. This 
project would be carried out through a series of local 
demonstration projects in a number of school districts; 
the projects would bf: funded by OEO ana would test 
the CSPP-developed voucher model. This voucher model 
is central to the analysis; its features are briefly 
described below .4 In a broader sense, however, the 
educational voucher proposal is the occasion, not the 
subject of this discussion. My contention is that many of 
the obstacles placed in the road to a voucher project are 
built-in features of the educational system. The 
particular shape which these obstacles have taken in 
response to the voucher proposal is partly accidental, 
and they will continue, in one form or another, to 
plague this and other efforts to bring about educational 
change. 
To me, these obstacles are political characteristics of 
American education--political in the sense that they 
create and resolve conflict and define power relations. 
They are also political in their definition of a procedure 
through which major change must run before winning 
approval. The analysis in this essay, therefore, proceeds 
at three levels: 
*** It examines the intensely divisive social issues, 
such as race and church/state tensions, which provide a 
context for educational change, and which create an 
atmosphere in which it is practically impossible to focus 
on the educational merit of a proposal. 
*** It discusses structural roadblocks to the 
implementation of change. The primary and most 
debilitating of these is the extraordinary number of 
parties who must approve an educational experiment 
such as vouchers-and who must do so virtually 
simultaneously. The essay also examines the fragmenta-
tion of power which characterizes American education 
and the special threats posed by a voucher system to 
those who do have some power. 
***It d"escribes a process which relies on outsiders to 
design a plan for approval by local interests who face 
one another as antagonists in a social climate character-
ized by uncertainty, mistrust and hostility. 
CSPP staff members have, at the request of local 
officials and OEO, provided technical assistance to those 
cities which have been considering application to OEO 
for support of a local demonstration project.5 Material 
for this essay is drawn not only from the CSPP report, 
but of more importance, from the experiences of its 
staff in these cities. My hope is that this distillation of. 
experience will help to clarify the discussion of vouchers 
as well as to illumniate the why it is so exhaustingly 
'difficult to implement educational change. 
A quick look at the skeletal organization of school 
systems will aid in understanding the contrasting notions 
behind a voucher approach. The state creates local 
school districts and delegates legal responsibility for 
their operation to local school boards, which are elected 
or appointed by local officials. School districts levy 
taxes to pay for education and usually receive some 
additional assistance from the state. The school board is 
responsible for the allocation of these funds among the 
schools under its jurisdiction, as well as to various 
supporting services. The school board usually appoints a 
superintendent who serves as the chief administrative 
officer of the district. The board divides the district into 
attendance zones, and with some exceptions, where a 
child lives determines where he or she will go to school.6 
The amount of money spent at a particular school is 
determined by the superintendent and the school board. 
The same is true for teacher salaries and assignments, 
except where a strong teachers' union shares in these 
decisions. Parents often have little direct impact on the 
operation of schools but can periodically voice their 
approval or disapproval of overall policies through the 
election of school board members. 7 
Many different notions huddle under the name 
vouchers.8 They run all the way from the unregulated 
system proposed by Milton Friedman,9 to moderately 
regulated systems such as that proposed by John Coons 
and his associates, 10 to the more fully controlled system 
proposed by the Center for the Study of Public Policy. 
The last deserves some exposition, for it is the model 
around which much of the contemporary argument 
about vouchers revolves and its ideological structure and 
specific rules are directly related to the ongoing 
controversy over vouchers. 
All voucher systems have certain common character-
istics. They involve payment of public tax monies in 
support of education to parents instead of to local 
school authorities. To assure that the money would be 
spent on education, it would be transferred to parents as 
a credit-a voucher-rather than as cash. Parents would 
use their vouchers to purchase educational services for 
their children, from among a variety of schools. The 
voucher would be redeemable into cash usually only by 
approved schools, for approved educational activities 
only. 11 
The school board would no longer determine which 
school a child attended. Unlike the present situation, 
attendance would not be based on geography; a child 
could choose to apply to the school around the corner 




Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 2 [1972], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol2/iss4/6
376 
The amount of money spent at an individual school 
would be determined by multiplying the number of 
children in attendance by the value of the voucher. 
Assume, for example, that the amount of the voucher 
were set at the average per pupil expenditure of the 
school system, e.g. $1,000 per child. A school that 
enrolled 100 children would have an operating budget of 
$100,000 (100 x $1,000), exclusive of grants that it 
might obtain from such outside sources as foundations 
and the federal government. 
The end result is a system of schooling in which (a) 
attendence is no longer geographically controlled and (b) 
the amount of money available to a school is determined 
by its ability to attract and hold students. Since housing, 
like schooling, is racially and economically segregated, 
the first change, at least theoretically, breaks the link 
between race/income and access to a particular school. 
The second change is intended to create an incentive 
structure which rewards responsiveness of schools to 
students and parents. Young people would no longer 
enroll in a particular school at the fiat of the school 
board. If schools wanted to attract students, so the 
theory runs, their programs would have to be responsive 
to the perceived needs of those students. 
Beyond these minimal concepts, voucher models vary 
widely. Most of the variation is explained by the 
ideological positions or values held by proponents of a 
particular plan. The plans differ largely in the degree of 
regulation of the admissions "marketplace"-i.e., in the 
degree to which the free choice of students by schools, 
or schools by students, is circumscribed in order to serve 
values other than freedom. 12 The voucher system 
proposed by CSPP is more highly regulated than many 
others. The regulations, for the most part, are aimed at 
insuring equal access to schools for children of all races 
and socio-economic status, assuring at least minimal 
standards of educational quality and providing sufficient 
information to parents to facilitate choice. Thus under 
the CSPP system, to become eligible to cash vouchers, a 
school would have to: 13 
I. accept a voucher as full payment for a child's 
education, charging no additional tuition; 
2. accept any applicant so long as it has vacancies; 
3. if it had more applicants than places, fill at least 
half of the places by a lottery and the other half in such 
a way as not to discriminate against ethnic minorities; 
4. accept uniform standards for suspension and 
expulsion of students; 
5. agree to make a wide variety of information about 
its facilities, teachers, program and students available to 
the public; 
6. maintain accurate and public financial accounts; 
7. meet existing state requirements for private 
schools. 
Three more aspects of the CSPP plan are worthy of 
note, for they have influenced the politics of vouchers. 
First, children could attend any eligible school, public or 
private. The proponents of the plan were less concerned 
with who ran the schools (public officials v. private 
citizens) than how they ran them (without discrimina-
tion and responsively). Second, the system would be 
operated by an Educational Voucher Agency (EVA) 
which could but might not be directly controlled by the 
local school superintengent or school board. Although 
the school board would still be responsible for the 
operation of the public school system, the schools in 
that system would have to meet the requirements 
established by the EV A in order to be eligible for 
voucher funds. Schools not operated by the school 
board-private schools-would have to meet the same 
requirements. Third, the proposal calls for somewhat 
higher payments to schools· which enroll children from 
poor families. The basic mechanism sets the redemption 
value of the voucher higher for children from poor 
families than for children of the more affluent. 14 
In summary the CSPP voucher proposal calls for 
financing education by payments to parents. It provides 
more regulation than most other voucher proposals and 
calls for higher expenditures for the education of poor 
children. It is called a regulated compensatory voucher 
system. 
The idea of vouchers has been around at least since 
Adam Smith.15 Its eon temporary American history 
includes support from such varied authors as the 
conservative economist Milton Friedman 16 and the 
liberal Dean of Harvard's Graduate School of Education, 
Theodore Sizer! 7 Christopher Jencks, head of CSPP, 
had also written several articles discussing vouchers. 18 
OEO considered the voucher idea and eventually funded 
CSPP to develop a model and provide technical 
assistance to cities considering a demonstration project. 
The Center ,(CSPP) received a grant in December of 1969 
and in March of the following year, issued its first 
report. This report contained a survey of voucher 
approache.s, its own proposed model (the regulated 
compensatory system), a discussion of the requirements 
for a demonstration project, and an analysis of some 
troubling legal issues (racial segregation and church-state 
problems). For a variety of reasons not relevant here, the 
report suggested a project limited to elementary schools. 
OEO and the Center subsequently distributed copies of 
the report as well as an invitation to consider participa-
tion in a demonstration project to dozens of cities across 
the country. The cities were chosen for size: around 
10,000 children were originally considered to be 
appropriate for a demonstration. These cities were 
selected for the heterogeneity of their populations in the 
potential test areas. OEO was anxious to establish a 
project in an area with a racially and economically 
mixed population. For constitutional and related 
reasons, cities under court order to correct dual 
segregated school systems were eliminated from 
consideration. Some weight was also given to finding 
cities with existing private schools which would become 
voucher schools for the duration of the project and, 
eventually, to cities where such schools were likely to 
develop.19 
Taken together, these criteria suggest large urban areas 
above the Mason-Dixon line as the logical places for 
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projects.20 The criteria practically assure that any 
demonstration would include a reasonably high 
percentage of children from poor families, an important 
concern ofOEO and CSPP. But they have other 
implications. Foremost among them is that CSPP would 
deal with the school systems generally thought of as 
being in the deepest trouble-inner-city systems. These 
school systems would be characterized by critical 
educational and financial difficulties, as well as by 
communities split racially, socially, and politically .21 
This situation struck no one as the ideal climate in which 
to create a social experiment. Yet the mandate of OEO 
and the interest of the CSPP staff was precisely to 
improve education in the cities, where the problems of 
poverty and educational failure were-and remain-
acute. 
The difficulties experienced so far in establishing a 
demonstration site quite possibly have more to do with 
the times and their particular turmoil than anything else. 
Certainly other social reforms have experienced similar 
difficulties.22 It does seem unusual, however, that a 
proposal for a demonstration project, not a permanent 
change, should encounter the intensity of opposition 
met by the voucher proposal.23 The reason is found, I 
think, in the relation of the politics of reform through 
vouchers to the realities of change in American 
education. The next sections of this essay, therefore, 
deal with the politics of vouchers from three perspec-
tives: issues, structure, and process. At times the 
distinction between these categories blurs, but they have 
proved useful in developing a focus for discussion. 
At all levels-from local meeting halls, to state 
legislatures, to OEO--discussions of vouchers have 
revolved around several issues, among which race and 
religion have been the most troubling. Each issue has a 
long and bitter history; each is current and real beyond 
the boundaries of the voucher proposal. 
Race. It is hardly a surprise that the voucher proposal 
would stumble time and time again on racial problems. 
Everyone involved in the project was aware of the real 
and imagined race-related dangers which the prospect of 
a demonstration would raise. A number of southern 
states have tried and failed to use publicly supported 
voucher or tuition grant plans to maintain segregated 
school systems. The judicial history of these attempts 
provides clear assurance that they will not be permitted 
to stand.24 Even privately sponsored "segregation 
academies" have been denied tax advantages.25 The 
legal situMion with regard to a voucher plan established 
where there is no previous finding of purposeful 
segregation is less clear; strong arguments have been 
made that any plan which did not fully protect against 
the possibility of increased racial segregation would be 
legally suspect. Recent developments in the northern 
segregation cases lend support to the contention that 
courts are less likely than before to find "accidental" 
school board activities that lead to a pattern of racial 
segregation.26 
Even if the legal situation were entirely clear, the 
conflict over racial segregation would still ba central. 
The previous history of voucher plans in the South, 
regardless of their ultimate legal fate, has made the 
entire approach suspect to liberals and blacks, both at 
the national and local levels. The Nixon administration's 
"southern strategy" and its subsequent stormy history in 
the field of civil rights has done little to reassure 
committed integrationists that the voucher proposal was 
not part of an attempt to dismantle even the limited 
desegregation of the past decade. This was and is true 
even though many of the regulations in the CSPP model 
were constructed to insure a racial and social mix in 
voucher schools. As one CSPP field representative put it, 
" ... the precedent of using public funds to finance 
segregation academics in the South is a fearful specter, 
and, regardless of the intellectual merits of our 
guidelines, they did not provide a sufficiently dramatic 
line of demarcation between our theoretical system and 
the real and present danger of the segregation acad-
emies." 27 CSPP field staff members sometimes 
suspected that people concerned about this issue had not 
read the CSPP report, but simply had rejected it out of 
hand because of Nixon administration sponsorship and 
the tainted history of voucher plans. 
At the national level, this meant that practically every 
major national organization concerned with race and 
education-from the NAACP, to the American Jewish 
Congress, to the National Education Association-
expressed public or private concern about the potential 
racial impact of a successful demonstration. Even if their 
representatives privately agreed that the CSPP safeguards 
might be sufficient, as some of them reluctantly did, 
they feared that state legislatures and others would not 
adopt such stringent rules in the future. Thus, they 
preferred no demonstration at all, even though a 
carefully controlled system, they conceded, might be of 
educational merit.28 
While the pressure at the national level came from 
mostly pro-integration sources, the local situation was 
more complicated. First, some whites were concerned 
that they would lose control over guaranteed access to 
virtually all-white neighborhood schools. From their 
perspective, the concern was accurate. The neighbor-
hood school, arbitrarily segregated by housing patterns, 
is one of the targets of many voucher plans. People 
would not be guaranteed access to a neighborhood 
school, although no one would be denied access to a 
school simply because it was nearby. Since at least half 
of the places in oversubscribed schools would be filled 
by lottery, chances are that some children would be 
required to attend schools outside of their immediate 
neighborhood. That this is already true all over the 
country, and has been for years, is no consolation. The 
underlying issue is race and many white parents feared 
that vouchers would lead to more integration, not less. 
Second, the black community was often split between 
those who still favored integration and others who had 
377 
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abandoned integration in favor of increased efforts to 
gain control over local, predominantly black schools. 
The former group was convinced that in practice 
vouchers would harden existing patterns of segregation; 
the latter, was equally certain that vouchers would 
encourage factionalism and sap energies needed to gain 
political control over decentralized school systems in 
urban areas. CSPP was, in effect, caught in an unresolved 
struggle within the black community. It could assure 
neither group that a voucher approach would yield 
precisely the result it desired. Nor could it with certainty 
claim that the fears of either were entirely without 
justification. CSPP field representatives were constantly 
forced to walk a narrow line between the type of candor 
about potential problems rightly demanded from social 
researchers and the advocacy usually expected from 
social reformers. Given the high level of tension over 
racial issues, the resultant uncertainty created consider-
able difficulty in local black communities. 
In more than one instance, black community and 
political leaders expressed concern that the voucher 
proposal had surfaced at a time when they were 
beginning to develop some control over local institu-
tions. Some saw the plan as a calculated attempt to 
prevent further local control by blacks; others simply 
saw its consequences as promoting individualistic 
solutions to social or community problems. The former 
argued that the voucher strategy was similar to the white 
push toward political metropolitanism in cities such as 
Atlanta where blacks were becoming politically potent. 
Those who held the latter view feared that only the most 
active, informed parents would be able to take advantage 
of a voucher plan and they would do so mainly to 
improve the situation of their own children. One result, 
they argued, would be to deprive the reform movement 
in black communities of the people most likely to 
provide leadership. In addition, there was a more general 
frustration with the new complexities which vouchers 
would create. "Just when we learn the game and begin 
to get some control," one black school board member 
said during a conference, "you come along and want to 
change the rules." He went on to cite the national 
increase in black school board members, from several to 
several hundred, and argued that this was simply no time 
to change the structure of the political system which 
controlled the schools. 
Religion. Concern over the separation of church and 
state is not new to the United States. The First 
Amendment to the Constitution is central testimony 
that the issue has long preoccupied political minds. 
Public schools have only more recently become central 
to church-state debates.29 Although few and of 
relatively recent vintage, these educational concerns have 
made their way through the judicial maze into the 
Supreme Court.30 
As important as these legal considerations are, they 
could have been bypassed by voucher proponents. The 
voucher plan could simply have excluded participation 
by religious schools at whatever constitutional risk that 
entailed. But several reasons counselled against this 
solution. First, voucher proponents were by and large 
committed to relatively unfettered parental choice of 
schools. Although many voucher supporters expressed 
no particular sympathy for schools segregated on 
religious grounds, they did not find this form of 
discrimination as invidious as racial segregation, and the 
principle of free choice led them toward rejecting 
outright elimination of participation by religious 
schools. They preferred to leave that decision to local 
communities of parents or the mandate of the state and 
federal constitutions. 
Of more importance, perhaps, are the political and 
educational realities of religious schools and urban areas. 
Voucher proponents seek to open significantly more 
school choices to parents, even if the schools are not all 
ones that they would choose for their own children. The 
creation of new schools would be slow and difficult. 
Therefore, already existing alternatives became 
important. Only a small percentage of children attend 
private schools now, perhaps 10-15% of the school age 
population, according to preliminary 1970 census 
estimates. Although exact figures are hard to come by, 
there is general agreement that the overwhelming 
majority of these children attend schools with religious 
affiliations. In the cities most of these schools are 
affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church and most of 
them with local parishes. The fate of these parochial 
schools inevitably became of concern to voucher 
planners. 31 
Even a casual newspaper reader is aware that parochial 
schools have been in serious financial trouble for some 
time. Many have closed and more threaten to do so. 
Religious vocations are down; teaching nuns are fewer in 
number. Lay teachers have increased in number and they 
have become more militant in their demands for higher 
wages. At the same time, other costs have increased, 
both for schools and for other activities financed by 
local parishes. The result has been heavy financial 
pressure on parochial schools. The alternative to 
increasing the strain on the parish treasury and the 
collection plate has been to raise tuition levels. Where 
this has not been possible or desirable, the schools have 
been closed. The resulting pressures have created a 
scramble for ways to provide support for religious 
schools. Consequently, the political and legal reaction 
from those who oppose public aid to parochial schools 
has increased. 
In response to these pressures and counterpressures 
several states passed laws to aid private schools religious 
schools among them. Pennsylvania was one of them, and 
its action led eventually to a U.S. Supreme Court test of 
the commonly adopted approach-purchase of 
services-in which the state "purchases" certain "secular 
educational services" from non-public schools. In Lemon 
v. Kurtzman, 32 the Supreme Court overturned the 
Pennsylvania statute and with it, presumably, this 
avenue to public support for religious schools.33 During 
the period all this activity was taking place, some did 
look to vouchers at least as an alternative approach to 
finding the requisite support for parochial schools.34 
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Although it was not the centerpiece of the most recent 
round of church-state tensions, the voucher proposal 
was seen by the protaganists fu this struggle as a critical 
factor. 
One of the ironies related to vouchers is that liberals 
who might have found the approach attractive for 
educational reasons, opposed it out of concern over the 
separation of church and state. Voucher proponents had 
counted for example, on support from reform-minded 
members of school boards. Yet these "liberals" were also 
apt to oppose substantial indirect aid to religious school 
as violative of the spirit, if not the letter, of the First 
Amendment. On the other hand, where the local 
supporters of aid had chosen to pursue purchase of 
services, they tended to view voucher proposals as less 
desirable. They feared that vouchers would draw 
energies away from the legislative battle for their 
preferred approach. They, therefore, quietly opposed or 
did nothing to assist voucher legislation at the state level. 
All in all, the issue tended to weaken the base of support 
for ·the voucher approach at the local, state and national 
levels. 
Other issues. A host of other issues developed around 
the proposal. Many, perhaps most of them, involved 
doubts that the plan would operate as its proponents 
predicted. For the most part, these were genuine 
arguments about substance and are implicit in any 
proposal for significant social change. To discuss them 
one by one here would recapitulate the lengthy process 
of debate which occurred at each possible site for a 
demonstration. I will, therefore, mention only two 
arguments which seem to have carried weight at the local 
level and with nationally based educational lobbies. 
The first is that a voucher approach, essentially freer 
parental choice, would "destroy the public schools." 
This issue was often raised by public school officials and 
representatives of teachers unions. 35 There is an irony, 
however, in the extent to which the CSPP proposal was 
actually designed with the situation of the public schools 
squarely in mind. The voucher planners estimated that a 
relatively low percentage of parents would choose to 
send their children outside of the existing public system, 
at least at the outset. Where possible, therefore, 
guidelines were designed to encourage change in public 
school systems and to give them a reasonable oppor-
tunity to compete with private schools. The level of the 
voucher would be set, for example, at or slightly above 
present average public school per pupil expenditures. 
Rules foi admission and expulsion of students were 
designed to prevent the public schools from becoming "a 
dumping ground" for children who were unable to gain 
entrance to private schools. In these and other ways, the 
system was designed to assure that the private schools 
would not reap an unfair financial advantage or be able 
to exclude easily children whom they viewed as difficult 
to educate. Partly as a result of these guidelines, some 
local school officials felt confident that they would be 
able to "outcompete" the private schools under the 
CSPP guidelines. 
The other issue which I wish to discuss here has two 
aspects: information and trust of parents. Or perhaps 
more accurately, it couples fear of misinformation and 
mistrust of parents. Significant opposition in public and 
private meetings developed over the question of whether 
enough accurate information could be provided and 
whether parents would be able to make intelligent 
decisions in the choice of schools for their children even 
with good information. The opinion that they could not 
was widely held, both by school officials and residents 
of the cities which explored the possibility of a 
demonstration project. The point of interest is that this 
skepticism was shared so widely. That public school 
officials would argue this position is not surprising. That 
other parents would adopt this view is more of a puzzle. 
It is difficult to tell whether the attitude stems from 
cynicism, elitism or paternalism; most likely, it flows 
from some combination of the three. But whatever the 
cause-and the possible validity of the concern aside-the 
result was to create a climate of mistrust and skepticism 
around a fundamental aspect of the system. This climate 
eroded support for a concrete test of issue: whether 
parents could and would choose wisely. Only a 
demonstration could supply that test, yet people were 
unwilling to take the risk of a demonstration unless they 
knew the answer to this and other difficult questions in 
advance. 
Examinations of the CSPP field reports confirms the 
reality and consistency with which these and other 
related issues were raised. Among them, racial problems 
seem the most divisive and widespread. The reports and 
on-site experience also yield a sense that the debate over 
issues often masked other, more personal concerns. 
These publicly inflammatory issues, however, served to 
polarize people and groups with potentially similar 
interests and to draw attention away from the basic 
educational aims of the voucher plan. This is not entirely 
surprising due to the complexity of even a relatively 
simple voucher plan and the depth of feeling about racial 
and church-state issues. 
Finally, meetings and debates sometimes left voucher 
proponents with a nagging feeling that there was an 
unbridgeable polarity between real and rhetorical issues. 
Were people perhaps less concerned about the debated 
issues than about their jobs, their power, the uncer-
tainties which a voucher system would create? Were 
most of the meetings, public more than private, a sham 
at worst or a show at best? 36 To the extent this more or 
less unprovable suggestion is accurate, factors other than 
those discussed thus far are more important in explain-
ing the politics of vouchers. 
Beyond the difficult issues raised by vouchers certain 
structural aspects of American education-an extensive 
system of checks and balances, and a lack of positive 
power-help to explain the difficulty in implementing a 
demonstration. Further, the voucl).er system challenges 
the entrenched structure and requires an unpopular shift 
of authority from the haves to the have-nots. 
379 
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Checks and balances. We are, or at least used to be, 
fond of talking about our political system as character-
ized by a government of checks and balances. Politicians, 
social commentators and ordinary citizens seem 
increasingly impatient and disturbed at what they see as 
the inability of the governmental system to respond 
creatively and experimentally to changing times. A look 
at the number and diversity of actors who participate in 
determining whether a voucher demonstration could 
occur illuminates this concern: 
- Federal level: the Office of Education, OEO; U.S. 
Congress, which considered the proposal in hearings, 
educational and related lobbies including the NEA 
AFT, Chief, State School Offic~rs, NAACP, Nation~! 
Committee in Support of the Public Schools and many 
others; possible White House clearance because of the 
controversial nature of the project; 
- State level: the State legislature and its several 
committees, which in most cases must pass enabling 
legislation; state department of education, usually the 
chief state school officer; the Governor, or his personal 
education advisor if there is one; various boards of 
education or regents; the state counterparts of the 
national educational lobbies, with particular concern for 
the teacher unions or similar organization; 
- Local level: the School board; the superintendent 
and various aides who review such programs before the 
superintendent will consider them; school principals; 
representatives of the teacher unions; local counterparts 
of the national and statewide educational lobbies, in 
some cases, the Mayor and or City Council; local 
community leaders; Model Cities education directors; 
the local poverty program officials; a wide variety of 
local parents and interested citizens, although their 
numbers were discouragingly small in some instances; 
- At all levels: courts in which legal challenges based 
on local law, state statutes and state and federal 
constitutions are lodged. 
To the reformer or advocate of careful educational 
experimentation, this list, though incomplete, is 
staggering. The time, energy and patience required to 
deal with such an array of participants is phenomenal. 
Probably no one connected with the voucher project 
would argue that social experimentation and reform on a 
re~atively large scale should be started too easily. Social 
experiments involve people and how they live; educa-
tional experiments involve children, who have even less 
control over their own lives than do adults. Reform 
experiments must, therefore, be carefully constructed 
and the risks made clear to people. Also, the ideology 
shared by CSPP staff counselled that people must enter 
such experiments voluntarily. But few would have 
predicted-or thought necessary-the degree of difficulty 
encountered or the complexity and number of steps 
involved in obtaining approval for a demonstration. 
After all, the project might mean a long-term federal 
investment of as much as $25 to $50 million to a local 
school district. Most of this sum would cover additional 
costs of the demonstration, but some portion would at 
least defer predictable increased costs. The demonstra-
tion might, for example, forestall the closing of 
parochial schools and thereby defer increased public 
school costs due to additional student enrollment. 
Moreover, it could place a district in the forefront of 
educational reform efforts, with the cost borne by the 
federal government. 
Beyond the problems encountered in obtaining 
approval from each, or most, of the many consti-
tuencies involved, there were considerable problems of 
protocol, prestige and power. Whom did one see first 
and why? Was the choice to be made on ideological or 
practical grounds? In at least one instance, for example, 
the superinjendent of a major school system was either 
unable or unwilling to meet with the CSPP field 
representative, despite local interest in a demonstration 
project and repeated efforts to arrange a meeting. 
Frustrated by continual rebuffs, the field representative 
decided to "light a fire" under the school official and 
began meetings with representatives from other agencies 
concerned with education. Although this finally led to a 
meeting with the school superintendent, the conversa-
tion and subsequent process was characterized by 
expressed and latent hostility created by the CSPP 
representative's initial intervention. The superintendent 
after careful consideration of the substance of the 
proposal, eventually denounced it at a school board 
meeting. The board voted down a feasibility study 
proposal and that ended the matter. The field repre-
sentative, who had predicted opposition from the 
superintendent, was nevertheless surprised by the 
vehemence of his objections and attributed it to the 
initial hostilities created by the mode of intervention. 
Perhaps, perhaps not, but the initial problem was clearly 
present. 
From the point of view of the superintendent. beset 
by racial and financial difficulties, the voucher 
representative had added a potentially uncontrollable 
new dimension to his problems, another proposal and a 
new set of factors to assess. The superintendent was 
intent upon pursuing his own solutions to the educa-
tional problems of the city and faced a need to gain 
approval from a large number of actors. In private 
conversations and in public discussions of the superin-
tendency, this official has expressed his own sense of 
lack of control over the system and frustration at the 
difficulty in creating viable educational reform. The 
intrusion of vouchers was seen as a complicating factor 
not as a potential solution to at least some of his 
problems. 
His view of his own lack of power is somewhat at odds 
with his clear ability to convince the school board to 
forego even full study of a possible demonstration, as 
well as with the conclusions of several political scientists 
who have examined the power of superintendents.37 
But the conflict is more apparent than real. The 
superintendent in this instance was able to exercise 
negative or veto power. He could stop the process at an 
early stage of consideration. He would have faced far 
greater problems had he endorsed the proposal and 
supported further study. Had he endorsed it, he could 
not have been: certain that at some later date he could 
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deliver on his promise that the program would become 
operational in his city. The negative course was far less 
risky. An experiment could fail but no experiment 
could not.38 
In addition, the obvious risks of failure are probably 
not compensated for by an incentive structure that 
rewards innovative success. Innovation requires change 
and change is accompanied by conflict. The general 
approach toward conflict in the training of school 
administrators is to avoid it. 39 Perhaps of more 
importance is the reaction to conflict of the school 
boards which appoint superintendents. The impressions 
gleaned from numerous meetings and conferences with 
board members is that they were interested in educa-
tional improvement so long as it did not create political 
turmoil. As elected officials, they saw their chances for 
continuation in office as enhanced if the city were calm 
and they had not created organized politiciil enemies. 
This was true whether the school boards were directly 
elected or appointed by an elected official such as the 
mayor.40 The short half-life of urban superintendents 
seems to confirm this hypothesis. So does the recent 
replacement of Philadelphia's innovative superintendent 
Mark Shedd, whose "resignation" followed the 
appointment of hostile school board members by Mayor 
Frank Rizzo, who had made Shedd's innovative school 
program one of the targets of his successful electoral 
campaign. The result of this and other well publicized 
examples is to create pressures on superintendents, 
mindful of their precarious tenure, to avoid controversy 
and substantial change. In several instances, even where 
local enthusiasm for a demonstration had been 
generated, it was discouraged at the state level e~ther at 
the department of education or in the legislature. A 
voucher experiment which involves public and private 
schools normally requires modification or waiver of 
provisions of the state education code. Some states vest 
considerable power in the state board of education to 
waive statutory provisions of the education code in 
order to accomodate experimental projects, but even 
this may not be sufficient to forestall the need, legal or 
political, for legislative approval.41 In most states, 
however, legislative action is a must and obtaining it 
from skeptical legislators has meant a replay of local and 
national difficulties at this level of government. 
In addition to the usual run of issues, legislative 
politics inevitably has added a note of open political 
partisanship to consideration of a demonstration. This is 
especially true where one political party controls the 
legislature and its opposite occupies the governor's 
mansion, a situation encountered more than once. In 
such cases, one side is often unwilling to support 
enabling legislation simply because it has the approval of 
the other. Since both executive and legislative approval 
are important, voucher proponents, once again, have 
been caught between contending forces who are 
ultimately concerned with something other than 
educational reform, in this case jockeying for political 
advantage. 
Lack of power. Lack of power is a corollary of the 
fragmentation of power described in the previous 
section. With so many factors influential in any decision 
of major significance, no one group or person has 
sufficient power to impose a decision. Further, it is 
easier to put together a coalition of opponents to new 
measures than a coalition of proponents for new 
approaches. People can usually find something they 
dislike about any change, even if they dislike different 
things. But new measures require agreement on specific 
issues.42 Education is probably not much different on 
this count than are other social functions, but that is 
little consolation to the person who seeks a "yes" to 
change rather than a "no". 
Perhaps no public system which deals with multi-
million dollar budgets and thousands of children can 
afford to vest power to create significant structural 
change in relatively few hands. The risks and costs of 
failure are viewed as too great. Moreover, the history of 
urban educational systems contains periods of political 
manipulation and patronage, which reinforce whatever 
mistrust of conflict and power educators might bring 
with them to their work.43 
The previous section related the ability of a particular 
superintendent to stop further consideration of the 
voucher proposal. If that were an isolated incident it 
would be no more than an interesting story. To the 
contrary, however, CSPP experience indicates that the 
superintendent was the pivitol figure in most cities. If 
any one person did hold power, at least negative power 
it was the superintendent. In part this situation might 
have been a self-fulfilling prophecy. OEO required the 
approval of the school board before it would fund a 
local feasibility study of a possible demonstration. Since 
school board members were mostly unpaid and 
overworked, they tended to look to the superintendent 
for guidance on complex matters of educational 
policy .44 
This reaction was also in part caused by the complex-
ity of the voucher proposal. Although the fundamental 
idea is easily explained in a sentence or tw~, full 
understanding of the CSPP regulated compensatory 
model requires considerable time and thought. The rules 
are few, but the reasons for them are not always 
self-evident. School board members, therefore, 
commonly relied on the superintendent to help them 
understand the model's complexity and its educational 
implications. Since they often had no paid, professional 
staff, they sometimes related to the superintendent as 
though he were a special assistant or counsel to the 
school board. There was, in effect, nowhere else they 
could go. 
The existence of a paid professional school board staff 
would enhance the power of board members to make 
informed, independent judgments on policy matters of 
this sort. At the very least it would blunt the advantage 
provided by the superintendent's status as a profes-
sional-Le., his being regarded as an "expert" on 
educational matters. But this.alternative might simply 
lead to a reduction in the superintendent's professional 
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status and power without a compensatory shift to the 
board. The ironic result could be a loss of power for 
everyone. 
Whatever the cause, the experience in attempting to 
gain approval for a voucher demonstration leads to the 
conclusion that the educational system is designed on 
the principle that with power, someone, somewhere 
might do something wrong. It is better then, to live with 
a system in which no one has sufficient power to 
accomplish substantial reform. Our experience suggests 
that the structure of public education reflects a 
preference for stability and certainty at the expense of 
risk and potential gain. The prospect for major change, 
therefore, seems minimal. 
Shift of Authority The previous sections have 
suggested that almost any significant change is severely 
hampered by the public school structure, particularly 
when volatile social issues are involved. The depth of the 
challenge posed by voucher systems intensifies this 
already powerful resistance. Although one academic 
commentator sees the plan as no more than a "gim-
mick," 45 public school authorities and other with more 
of a stake in the present system have taken its thrust 
more seriously.46 The latter view is more consistent 
with the reaction of local school officials and school 
boards, as well as the national watchdogs of educational 
policy. The national groups known as "the Big Six" 
vigorously opposed the demonstration from the .outset 
through policy statements, press releases and even 
Congressional testimony .47 
Those members of the "education establishment" who 
have taken vouchers as a serious threat to the existing 
structure and allocation of educational power hold the 
more accurate view. This does not imply that a 
demonstration would deliver all the educational gains 
predicted by voucher advocates; the purpose of a 
demonstration, after all, is. to determine whether their 
predictions are correct. Rather, a voucher approach 
would fundamentally alter the financial incentive· 
structure and the power alignments of American 
education. People and practices presently rewarded 
might no longer be so fortunate; power-even though 
limited-over many educational decisions would be 
shifted from the haves to the have-nots, from school 
bureaucracies and boards to parents. Bureaucrats and 
politics and politicians are sensitive to such changes and 
their intense opposition to modifications in the system 
which favors their hegemony over education is 
understandable. 
The voucher plan proposes to reward schools which 
succeed in convincing parents that their children ought 
to attend them. Schools would not be guaranteed a pupil 
population. To attract students the schools would have 
to be responsive to parents; principals and teachers 
would have to act like other professionals-lawyers and 
doctors, for instance-and establish a reputation for 
success in order to attract "clients." This would 
encourage increased professional responsiveness. But this 
increase in professional responsiveness-a strong client 
orientation-is disturbing to many "professional 
educators." To them it implies competition, which they 
fear will lead to shoddy practices and, above all, to 
greater uncertainty. 
The anxiety caused by uncertainty is heightened by 
two factors. First, there is widespread disagreement over 
the definition of educational success. It is better reading 
scores? Higher achievement in math? Entrance to 
college? A well adjusted child? A happy one? In this 
regard, education is unlike law and medicine, where 
standards are relatively clear or at least widely shared. 
Patients, after all, get cured or remain sick and lawsuits 
are won or lost. The predictable and observable result of 
this lack of agreement over the standards of educational 
success is that educators are understandably reluctant to 
embrace systems, like vouchers, which purport to reward 
performance particularly if parents determine what 
performance means.48 
Second, the impact of schooling and, by implication, 
the impact of educators on improving tfie achievement 
of poor children has been seriously questioned.49 The 
discouraging history of compensatory education 
programs, designed especially to develop and test 
methods of imp~oving the educational performance of 
poor children, further reinforces the tendency to shy 
away from systems which reward performance.50 
Assume that higher achievement is the accepted goal: If 
no one can be certain of the techniques to attain it who 
would want to risk financial penalties for failure? 
The voucher proposal, therefore, creates great anxiety 
in some educational circles partly because it implies 
competition and evaluation. More pointedly, it zeroes in 
on the fundamental problems of lack of goal consensus 
and mistrust of the technical tools available to solve 
educational problems. It proposes a reward or incentive 
structure which, theoretically at least, would require 
educators to face these questions squarely. Those who 
now share the rewards of the present educational 
structure, however inadequate, could not be expected 
happily to adopt the system, for they could not be sure 
that their educational goals would be shared by parents, 
nor, even if they were shared, that they would reach 
these goals. 
This leads to a final comment on structure. We have 
already seen that power in education is limited and 
fragmented. At each level, however, our experience 
indicates that one group consistently has less than its 
rightful share of power-parents, and particularly poor 
parents. The voucher approach is clearly intended to 
remedy that deficit. Whether it would succeed is another 
question, but the intention is clear. 
The clarity and directness of the aim of redistributing 
decision-making authority to the family has been a 
major obstacle to adoption of the voucher system. 
Despite the persistent public school rhetoric about 
democratic values, in the context of the proposed 
voucher experiment educators consistently expressed 
grave doubts about the capacity of parents to make wise 
educational decisions. Time after time, in private and 
public meetings, the plan was opposed on the grounds 
that parents would not understand the system; that they 
did not care enough to learn how it would work; that 
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only the most active among poor families would 
benefit.51 Granted, these views might have been and 
probably were sincerely held. (They were opposed with 
equal sincerity and vigor by parents at public meetings.) 
But the motivation behind the view is far less important 
for present purposes than the effect. The claim is not 
that public school officials seek to hold their own 
limited power merely for the sake of holding power. 
Rather, it is that the !basic impact of voucher schemes 
the shift of power from professions to parents 
practically assures the organized opposition of profes-
sional educators. This is so whether they are motivated 
by altrusitic educational concerns for the education of 
all children or by more selfish urges to power. 
In summary, structural aspects of American education 
have conspired against implementation of a voucher 
demonstration: complexity caused by the number of 
actors who must virtually simultaneously approve 
educational change; the inability of any person or group 
to muster sufficient power to impose change, and the 
direct threat to the already limited power of profes-
sionals posed by vouchers. The last factor leads to the 
final level of analysis. 
If examined carefully, the processes required by OEO, 
by federal intervention programs and consciously chosen 
by CSPP weigh heavily against the successful operation 
of a voucher demonstration. 
In determining the fate of a proposal for change, the 
way in which it is proposed and considered may be just 
as important as its substance.52 Several aspects of the 
way CSPP voucher demonstration projects have been 
presented and considered have hampered their imple-
mentation. In light of experience with local communi-
ties at least three factors related to process seem 
crittcal: the development and propagation of a model 
designed by outsiders; the need to acquire approval from 
mutually antagonistic parties to a demonstration-school 
systems and communities; and the atmosphere of 
bitterness and mistrust which characterizes the setting in 
which discussions and decisions take place. 
The OEO-CSPP voucher model has its origins in 
academia, Washington bureaucracies and "the rarified air 
of Cambridge." With the exception of relatively small 
numbers of parents who have seen vouchers as a solution 
to racial or religious problems of schooling, the original 
impetus for such experiments did not emerge from local 
communities. Nor was it born in school systems. The 
voucher idea is not a folk notion appropriated by 
intellectuals and bureaucrats; it is an intellectual's 
construct appropriated and propagated by bureaucrats. 
This fact has created several problems, the first of 
which is simply that it is harder for local people to 
understand the project than if they had developed it 
themselves. The basic idea behind vouchers is decep-
tively simple. Its elaboration into a working system 
consistent with egalitarian values is predictably complex. 
In this regard, it resembles many proposals for social 
change-the negative income tax, welfare reform, 
universal day care. Numerous discussions conferences 
and meetings showed that the CSPP staff members who 
helped to develop the model had a firmer grasp of its 
substance than school officials or community representa-
tives. This does not imply that staff members necessarily 
have a more accurate view of the consequences of 
implementation, but that a certain investment of time 
and effort is necessary to understand the import of the 
proposal. Had it been developed at the local level by 
local people, this investment would already have been 
made by a coterie of local leaders. Since it was not, 
CSPP staff and con sultan ts were forced to spend 
significant chunks of limited time simply explaining the 
idea and outlining its important details. Given limited 
time and resources, this often meant that the CSPP 
consultant had come and gone before discussion of the 
l s3 s· proposal had moved past its exp oratory stages. mce 
social reform, like God, is in the details, the complexity 
of the system, lack of information and misinformation 
have caused serious conflicts at the local level. 
Of more importance, if the idea had been developed at 
the local level, the process of developing it could have 
engendered a more genuine local commitment to its 
implementation. Field staff reports indicate a fairly 
consistent pattern at the local level: a visit by the CSPP 
staff member, which is greeted with skepticism and then 
gradual growth of enthusiasm for the idea; a local group 
or local individuals take some responsibility for further 
development of the idea; the field staff person leaves, 
activity at the local level grinds to a halt. 
In part this syndrome may have also been due to 
mistrust of another outsider, the federal government as 
personified by OEO. One CSPP report put the matter 
succinctly. 
A final point which was raised frequently by board members, 
community people, and school administrators was, "How can we 
be sure that the funding of this project will be maintained for 
five years or more? If there is no such assurance, how can we be 
expected to go through the planning, dislocations, and building 
of hopes required with the possibility always present that the 
program may be yanked out from under us-~specially an O._E.O. 
program with their history of start-stop fundmg and uncertam 
Congressional support." 
Clearly, there is no way to answer this question satis-
factorily. 54 
This problem is endemic to federally funded reform 
efforts. Congress appropriates money yearly and this 
leads to unavoidable uncertainty as to the future fate of 
every project. 
A further difficulty developed from the decision to 
design a general model which could be implemented 
almost anywhere with relatively minor modifications. 
This decision created tensions between specificity and 
generality in the plan itself and in the minds of its 
potential consumers. Since the basic model was not 
designed jointly with a local community to fit its 
particular needs, aspects of the plan beyond minimal 
safeguards are left for determination by the people who 
would participate in a demonstration. The lack of 
specificity is partly unavoidable and partly designed. 
Some questions simply could not be answered outside of 
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a local context, for example, the exact value of the 
voucher or the shape of the transportation system. 
Others could have been answered but were left to local 
determination, for example, whether profit-making firms 
could participate in the system. In part this latter group 
of questions was left unanswered in order to encourage 
people at the local level to take an active part in shaping 
the plan. But note that by definition, these questions 
were seen by the planners and OEO as less central than 
those answered by the outsiders; they were not directed 
at the most important safeguards. This discrepancy was 
accurately noted by the local leaders most interested in 
participation. It did not increase their trust in the plan 
or the planners, for they saw the imposition of solutions 
to the important problems as analagous to what they 
viewed as the autocratic, nonparticipatory operation of 
local school systems. 
If too much specificity created problems, so did too 
little. The CSPP regulated compensatory voucher model 
goes beyond a skeletal outline. When local leaders and 
school officials found that it did not answer all their 
questions about implementation, they reacted skep-
tically. Were the CSPP consultants hiding something? 
Didn't they know the answers to the difficult questiol}s? 
Since the unanswerable questions often dealt with the 
specifics of local implementation, this lent credibility to 
the oft-repeated contention of school officials that the 
plan was "all right in theory, but that it could never 
work in practice." Here was the best of all positions for 
an opponent of the demonstration: simultaneous 
endorsement and rejection. Ironically, the opportunity 
for opponents to occupy this position was aided by 
CSPP's concern for a process that included local 
participation-a concern that cannot be fully imple-
mentated. 
But couldn't the concern for local process have been 
fully implemented? Probably not. To do so would have 
meant selecting a site, providing planning money and 
asking local school officials or community leaders to 
create a voucher plan with minimal outside guidance. 
OEO and CSPP were convinced that a plan developed by 
school officials would not be a plan that tolerated 
significant change.ss A plan developed mainly by local 
people outside of the school system would stand little or 
no chance of acceptance by the public schools. More 
importantly, the social and political implications of a 
grant to local parents to create a voucher system, 
without a guarantee of racial and other safeguards were 
simply too dangerous. Neither alternative, then, 
appeared plausible, and the problems of establishing a 
combined and equally representative local planning 
group of school officials and other local people outside 
the school system were just as complicated.56 
The second major process problem revolves around 
the need to gain approval from the school system and 
the community. More accurately, the major difficulty 
was the necessity of obtaining at least an initial "go 
ahead" from the school system before extensive work 
with community groups could proceed vigorously. 
Gaining such approval was necessary, as indicated above, 
if the public schools were to become involved. Since the 
voucher planners were convinced that most children 
would continue to attend public schools under any 
feasible model, the public school system was a critical 
partner in the demonstration. Moreover, the prospect of 
starting a "federal" school system in a city contrary to 
the wishes of local school authorities was out of the 
question, particularly for an administration rhetorically 
and politically committed to returning power to the 
states and localities. 
Nevertheless, this requirement put voucher pro-
ponents in the awkward position of seeking initial 
approval from the very parties most threatened by the 
proposal. Since school officials finally had effective veto 
power over whether a demonstration would occur CSPP 
staff were reluctant to assist community groups before 
obtaining a positive signal from school officials. To have 
done so would have put them, outsiders in the 
uncomfortable position of creating expectations which 
they might lack the power to fulfill Yet the result was 
to place the proposal before school officials without 
indications of significant community interest, and 
without the support of a political constituency behind 
it. Since there is little reason to think that school board 
members differ from other politicians, voter support 
would have increased their enthusiasm for a voucher 
demonstration. The lack of it could and probably did 
hamper development of a demonstration. This conclu-
sion does not imply that CSPP staff, technical consul-
tants, should (or should not) have acted as community 
organizers or advocates. Other considerations are 
involved in such a judgment. Putting that question aside, 
the poip.t is simply that the role of the technical 
consultant and the mode of operation insulated the 
decision-making procedure from at least part of the 
legitimate customary political process-the development 
of voter support. 
Once school officials expressed approvai or at least 
enough interest to allow the process to continue, 
another reaction set occurred. The moment that the 
educational establishment supported a proposal many 
local leaders and parents began to question its virtue. 
How could a fresh young idea keep its virginity in that 
company? In part this reaction was due to a general 
climate of mistrust, which is discussed further below. 
But it was also due to an accurate sense that school 
systems, like other institutions, would not readily adopt 
a proposal which required fundamental change in their 
governing structure. The history to date confirms that 
the judgment of local leaders and parents has been 
correct. s7 
A city is a social organization and its general 
atmosphere, the "organizational climate," is bound to 
have an effect on the receptivity of its various parts to 
new ideas and change.s8 The social and political history 
of American cities in recent years has been torn by 
conflict. School systems have not escaped unscathed 
and, in fact, have often been in the midst of the most 
bitter strife.s9 One legacy of this conflict is a climate of 
suspicion, bitterness and mistrust between school 
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officials and local communities. Neither group is 
immune from these feelings and the resultant name-call-
ing, anger and mistrust were evident at most voucher 
meetings where both groups were present. Our 
experience in this regard is not unique. Anyone who has 
attended public school board meetings or watched them 
on television has had similar experiences.6<1 Some of the 
confrontation-type behavior experienced at such 
meetings was presumably political showmanship or 
simply an opportunity for people to release pent-up 
emotions. Over time and with appropriate assistance, 
this process of emoti<;mal confrontation may be useful, 
perhaps necessary, in order that "psychological and 
social energy ... (not) . . be played out in indirect and 
destructive ways .... " 61 But time was usually short and 
the relationship between the parties at meetings was not 
continuing, but occasional. Moreover, the CSPP 
representatives were not simply neutral, disinterested 
parties but usually people who, over time, had developed 
some commitment to the development of a voucher 
demonstration. Thus, the emotional climate often did no 
more than create an atmosphere in which genuine 
conversation about the merits and demerits of vouchers 
was impossible. This tended to drive meetings into 
private which, in turn, led to further feelings of mistrust. 
These feelings would explode at later public meetings. 
The process, by then, had become frustratingly circular. 
In addition to the general climate, there was, as 
indicated previously, pervasive skepticism about the 
viability of educational and other reforms. Too much 
had been promised; too little had been delivered. One 
field representative found that both parents and school 
officials were simply tired of the complexity and 
disappointments of the federal grant process, particu-
larly where complicated educational reforms were 
involved.62 
The end result of the process, which is partly 
necessitated by politics and partly chosen by CSPP and 
OEO, has been to place additional obstacles in the way 
of development of a voucher demonstration project. 
Perhaps a cautiously phased planning process, with 
greater local participation at all stages, would ease the 
problems created by the sponsorship and development 
of the original model by outsiders-the federal govern-
ment and CSPP. However, the climate of social and 
personal mistrust prevalent in American cities today 
dims current prospects for any significant educational 
change. 
Attempts so far to implement a demonstration 
voucher project highlight the political problems of 
educational reform in America. The danger, of course, is 
that general conclusions drawn from a particular case are 
not generalizations at all, but peculiarities of a given set 
of circumstances. In this case, however, the interests and 
issues at stake are not limited to an attempt to finance 
education by payments to parents. Perhaps the modestly 
radical nature of the proposal creates unique difficulties; 
more likely, it merely intensifies and, therefore, 
underlines the obstacles that educational reformers face 
time after time. 
At least one aspect of the voucher story is of course, 
unique to its own history: the particular cast of 
characters involved (including the author) and their 
inevitable human errors. The development of the plan 
and the search for an appropriate demonstration site has 
not been without flaw. Voucher advocates, for example, 
may not have fully appreciated the complexity of the 
implementation process and the deep divisiveness of the 
issues involved. Probably too little time was allowed for 
the development of the original report, additional time 
would have permitted more detailed attention to 
planning implementation strategies and fuller elabora-
tion of the problems later encountered in responding to 
local inquiries for information and technical assistance. 
Yet, damaging as such errors on the part of voucher 
advocates may have been, it would still be virtually 
impossible to conclude that such flaws have been 
critical. Opponents of education experimentation and 
reform are equally human, and they too have made 
mistakes in seeking to prevent a voucher demonstration 
project. However, comparing the errors of the opposing 
sides in the voucher controversy obscures the structural 
reality that the educational reformer faces: the 
educational system places heavy burdens on reform, 
regardless of merit, and even when the proposal is 
carefully limited, reasonably controlled and only 
designed for demonstration purposes. 
In describing the voucher proposal, I have used the 
terms "experiment," 'demonstration" and "reform" 
more or less interchangeably. In part this usage reflects 
the complexity of the proposal, for it has many aspects, 
but it also represents the general ambiguity of proposals 
to create reform projects in education. The voucher 
proposal, and others like it, support reform by proposing 
a new structural basis for educational systems. It is a 
demonstration, as well, for one of the most pervasive 
doubts concerning the viability of voucher systems is 
whether they could operate on a practical day-to-day 
basis; the project is designed, in part, to show that they 
could. But it is also experimental in the attempt to 
determine how parents, teachers and children would 
behave under significantly changed educational ground 
rules. 
Herein lies a final irony, not only of vouchers but of 
similar proposals in education and other areas of social 
concern. Because it calls for new arrangements, the 
proposal creates uncertainty: Are the changes workable? 
How will people respond, e.g., will parents choose wisely 
if they are free to select schools for their children? To 
obtain the answers to such questions is a primary reason 
to mount an operating project for a limited time. If 
there were no uncertainties, there would be less reason 
for a demonstration. But since the demonstration would 
not take place in a laboratory, it would involve real 
people with legitimate interests. They understandably 
seek unequivocal answers to their questions before they 
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are willing to risk a demonstration which might 
adversely affect them. Thus, their desire for assurance 
runs directly counter to the unanswered questions which 
are part of a demonstration proposal. Ironically, 
therefore, the uncertainties characteristic of the 
demonstration proposal are both a primary source of its 
justification and of its opposition. 
Despite difficulties, the likelihood is that before too 
long a voucher demonstration will take place. Pro-
ponents and opponents of vouchers should support this 
end. To argue this is not to advocate one particular 
solution to educational problems as a panacea. Rather, it 
is advocacy for a varied, experimental approach to the 
problems of necessary educational reform. 
13
McCann: The Politics and Ironies of Educational Change: The Case of Vouch
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1972
1. Mosteller and Moynihan (eds.), On Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (1972). This is a collection of essays analysing the 
U. S. Office of Education-sponsored report, Equal Educational 
Opportunity, commonly known as the Coleman report. 
2. As one current example of the difficulties of the change 
process, see Gross, Giaquinta and Bernstein, Implementing 
Organizational Innovations (1971). 
3. The Center is a nonprofit corporation located in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
4. A report on the project, Education Vouchers: A Report on 
Financing Education by Payments to Parents, is available from 
CSPP or from the Office of Economic Opportunity in Washing-
ton, D. C. The report is sometimes known as the "Jencks Plan" 
after its principal author, Christopher Jencks. It is hereinafter 
referred to as Education Vouchers. 
5. I have served as Associate Director of the Project and 
participated in the development of the model as well as the field 
activities of the Center. Some of the data for this essay is drawn 
from personal experiem:e. The rest has been developed from 
extensive Center field rnports and personal interviews with the 
staff, as well as with local officials, parents and others. In most 
instances, cities and individuals will go unnamed. My intention is 
to tease out some tentative generalizations about politics and 
change in American education, not to add to the abundant 
supply of gossip. At the moment, no school district has gone 
through all the steps ne1~essary to become a demonstration site. 
Some have considered the prospect and decided against it; others 
still have it under consideration. 
6. Some districts have open enrollment plans which theoret-
ically allow children to attend any school in a district. Adminis-
trative practices and the practical problems of getting from one 
part of town to another can minimize the impact of such plans. 
Some "freedom of choice" plans have been held unconstitu-
tional where districts are under order to eliminate racially 
segregated dual school systems. Green v. County School Board 
of New Kent County, 391 U.s: 430, 88 S. Ct. 1689 (1968). 
Attendance outside of the school district in which a child resides 
is relatively rare. Hartford's Project Concern and Boston's Metco, 
which bus city children to suburban schools, are notable 
exceptions. 
7. In situations where the school board is appointed by the 
Mayor or other elected officials-as in San Francisco, for 
example-parental pressure on school practice though real, is 
even less direct. 
8. For a more complete examination of the voucher plan 
discussed here, as well as others, see Education Vouchers, 
especially pages 1-58. Chapter 2 of the report contains a 
description and analysis of several different models of voucher 
systems. 
9. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962). 
10. Coons, Clune and Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public 
Education (1970). 
11. Some plans call for "partial vouchers," i.e., less than the full 
cost of education, which could be spent on supplementary or 
remedial educational services. These will not be discussed here. 
See, for example, Coleman; Toward Open Schools, The Public 
Interest, Fall, 1967. 
12. One of the least enlightening rhetorical battles attending 
voucher proposals revolves around the free market analogy 
sometimes used to describe the underlying idea of free choice. 
Rather than debate the analogy, it has generally proved more 
useful to deal directly with the problems related to freer parental 
choice in education. · 
13. For a more complete listing of the rules, see Areen and 
Jencks, Education Vouchers: A Proposal for Diversity and 
Choice, 72 Teachers College Record 327, 331 (1971), from 
which this list was culled, or Education Vouchers. 
14. This feature of the plan has not created a great deal of 
difficulty so far, but might in a final planning state. The 
approach is similar to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education ACT (ESEA) but assures that the extra dollars go to 
the school which the poor child attends. See chapter 2 of 
Education Vouchers. 
15. For a more historical view see West, Education and the State 
(1965). 
16. "The Role of Government in Education," in Capitalism and 
Freedom, supra note 9. 
17. Sizer and Whitten, A Proposal for a Poor Children's Bill of 
Rights, Psychology Today, Aug. 1968. 
18. See, for example, his Is the Public School Obsolete, The 
Public Interest, Winter, 1966, or Private Schools for Black 
Children, The New York Times Magazine, No. 3, 1968. 
19. See chapters 5 and 9 of Education Vouchers for further 
discussion of the demonstration. 
20. The search for a demonstration area began before the 
intensification of the current court battles asking to find 
unconstitutional segregation of the schools in northern cities. 
See Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There is But One 
Constitution, 7 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties L. Rev. 1 
(1972). Even so, at least one promising northern possibility has 
been ruled out of current consideration because of a desegrega-
tion suit initiated since the inception of discussions with school 
authorities and the local community. 
21. For a description of the educational aspects of what one 
commentator calls the "civil war" in American cities, see 
Resnick, Turning on the System (1970). 
22. For an analysis of another OEO sponsored experiment, see 
Morris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform (1969). 
23. By comparison with other reform projects, the voucher 
proposal would be rather modest in size. Conversations with 
local groups have generally revolved around a five to eight year 
commitment of amounts of anywhere from $2-$5 million per 
year of federal funds. Granted, this is a large sum of money, but 
it must be considered in the context of the annual operating 
budget of the school systems which examined the proposal. 
Figures of anywhere from $100 million to more than $300 
million were not uncommon. I resist the inevitable invitation to 
compare the cost of the voucher projects to the cost of a day in 
the "reform" of Vietnam, although just barely. 
24. See Appendix B, Education Vouchers for an examination 
of these cases. 
25. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970); 
dismissed, 400 U.S. 986, 91 S.Ct. "460 (1970). 
26. See Appendix B, Education Vouchers and Dimond, School 
Segregation in the North . .. , supra note 20. 
27. Quoted from a CSPP field staff memo discussing local 
reaction to vouchers. 
28. This position was vigorously argued, for example, by a 
former civil rights official in the Johnson administration at an 
Advanced Administrative Institute at Harvard Graduate School 
of Education in the fall of 1970. 
29. See Sizer (ed.), Religion and Public Education (1967). 
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30. Reviews of these cases abound. Foi two essays specifically 
related to church-state tensions and vouchers, however, see 
Appendix A, Education Vouchers and Areen and McCann, 
Vouchers and the Citizen-Some Legal Questions, 72 Teachers 
College Record 389 (1971). 
31. Although inaccurate, I will conform to the common practice 
of using the terms religious and parochial schools interchange-
ably. Parochial schools are actually schools supported by a local 
parish and the term, therefore, does not even include all Roman 
Catholic schools. Since they enroll the largest number of 
children they are, for our purposes, the most central to this 
discussion. 
32. 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2125 (1971). 
33. For review of state legislation and its limitations, see 
Vouchers and Other State Plans for Aiding Private Schools: A 
Comparison in Education Vouchers. 
34. The Citizens for Educational Freedom, a private group, has 
long proposed a children's bill of rights and others have also 
adopted the GI Bill as a model for tuition support approaches 
similar to vouchers. They have been opposed with equal vigor by 
groups such as the Americans United for the Separation of 
Church and State. 
35. Usually at odds with one another, the public stances of both 
groups, when they feel threatened from outside, is mutually 
defensive. To some extent this behavior is predictable and 
understandable. Robert Crain found similar defensive behavior 
on the part of school superintendents faced with desegregation 
crises. For a brief summary of his explanation for their behavior, 
see The Politics of School Desegregation, in Kirst (ed.), The 
Politics of Education 133-139 (1970). Perhaps the surprise is 
that a number of school officials privately took a different 
stance. They viewed the voucher proposal as a possible way to 
regain some latitude which they felt they had lost to increasingly 
powerful teachers unions. This attitude seemed more common 
among school board members, although no accurate count of 
those who responded in this fashion is available. 
36. At the very least, these meetings were characterized by 
competetive or "selling" behavior. The negative results of this 
style of operation in another context is described by Chris 
Argyris in Management and Organizational Development (1971) 
at 98-99. 
37. Some board members indicated an interest in pursuing the 
study but voted not to. 
They explained that they tended to support the superin-
tendent on such matters unless they were in strong disagreement. 
CSPP field reports. See also the Introduction to Kirst, The 
Politics of Education, supra note 35. 
38. It is interesting to note that this same superintendent has 
developed a subsystem within his school district in which the 
schools represent alternative educational styles. Parents in the 
subdistrict are able to choose which schools their children will 
attend regardless of which school is closest to home. 
39. As an example see Rosenthal, Administrator· Teacher 
Relations: Harmony or Conflict, in Kirst, The Politics of 
Education, supra note 35. 
40. For a brief description of the policial context of education 
as seen by a former principal, now superintendent see chapter 
11 of Foster, Making Schools Work (1971). 
41. The State Board of Education in Connecticut, for example, 
has wide authority to waive legal requirements for experimental 
projects, but voucher proponents have still sought enabling 
legislation. See Connecticut General Statutes Annotated (rev. 
1971), § 10-76(i). 
42. Kirst and his associates have found evidence to confirm this 
notion in voting behavior on educational issues. See The Politics 
of Education, supra note 35, at 11. 
43. Salisbury, Schools and Politics in the Big City, 37 Harv. Ed. 
Rev. 408 (1967). 
44. The pattern has been noted elsewhere. See Bendiner, The 
Politics of Schools, chapters 1 and 2 (1969); Cf, Kirst, The 
Politics of Education, supra note 35. 
45. Economist Eli Ginzburg, who sees the voucher plan as 
gimmickery, prefers housing desegregation and more money for 
ghetto schools as a solution. How he proposes to reach these 
objectives other than by angry denunciation of the current 
situation is unclear. The Economics of the Voucher System, 72 
Teachers College Record 373 (1971). 
46. David Selden, President of the American Federation of 
Teachers, views the voucher model as a more serious danger to 
public education. Undoubtedly and rightly influenced by his 
responsibility as a representative for so many teachers, he too 
calls for more money for education; yet he does see the voucher 
scheme as involving "dynamite" and fears that it is a "little 
lizard [which could grow) up to be a firebreathing dragon ... " 
Vouchers-Solution or Sop? 72 Teachers College Record 365 
(1971). 
47. The Big Six includes the National Education Association, 
the Association of Chief State School Officers, the National 
Association of School Boards, the American Association of 
School Administrators, the National Parent-Teacher Association, 
and the National Association of State Boards of Education. See 
NEA resolution 70-13, "Voucher Plans", June 1970. On January 
18, 1972, the Legislative Council of National Organizations, the 
legislative arm of the Six when they act in concern, issued the 
following statement: 
Public Funds and Nonpublic Schools 
We oppose the use of public revenues for the direct financing 
of nonpublic school systems at the elementary and secondary 
education levels; the use of the voucher system as a method of 
school finance; and tax credits for expenditures or living 
expenses at any elementary or secondary educational institution. 
(Emphasis Added). 
The source of this information is NEA Legislative Office 
Director, Stanley McFarland, who indicated that before the 
Legislative Council can act all six organizations must adopt a 
policy and all must agree. 
48. The relatively widespread acceptance of performance 
contracting experiments appears to contradict this conclusion. A 
closer look at performance contracting, however, indicates that 
it still has yet to be widely adopted by professional educators. 
Moreover, the groups being measured against performance 
standards were outside, independent-contractors. Teachers have 
not been quick to adopt this method of establishing salaries and 
other reward. For an excellent discussion of performance 
contracting, see D. Richard, Performance Contracting for Equal 
Opportunity and School System Renewal unpublished paper, 
Harv. Univ. Graduate School of Ed. (1971). 
49. Mosteller and Moynihan, On Equality of Educational 
Opportunity, supra note 1. 
50. For an analysis of compensatory programs which supports 
this view, see Rivlin, Systematic Thinking for Social Action, 
chapters 3-5 (1971). For a contrary view, see Levin, et al., 
Schools and Inequality (1972). Once again contrary to law and 
medicine, there is little faith that a given practice will lead to a 
particular cure or that the result in one case will yield experience 
that predicts the outcome in the next. 
51. I have reached this conclusion from personal experience at 
voucher meetings, from interviews with public school officials 
and from repeated conversations with other members of the 
CSPP staff whose experiences have been similar to mine. 
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52. A considerable body of social and behavioral science 
literature supports this view. See, for .example, Argyris, 
Intervention Theory and Method (1970); Bennis, Benne and 
Chin, The Planning of Change (1962). 
53. This in-and-out problem was cured to some extent by the 
affiliation of local consultants with CSPP staff or by relatively 
longer visits by CSPP staff in cities where the prospect of serious 
consideration was high. 
54. Excerpts from CSPP memo on field activities. For a 
somewhat different but consistent analysis of OEO sponsored 
educational reforms, see Morris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social 
Reform, supra note 22, at 58-71. 
55. The reluctance of school officials to consider more than a 
minimal voucher approach, limited to public schools only, is 
evidence that this conclusion was correct. The first year of the 
first actual demonstration may be so limited. For an analysis of 
similar problems of education reform, see Katz, The Irony of 
Early School Reform (1968). 
56. See Morris and Rein, The Dilemmas of Social Reform, supra 
note 22, at 139-190. 
57. Of five feasibility studies conducted at the local level, only 
one now shows a strong possibility of leading to a final 
application to OEO for support of a full-blown planning effort, 
the last major step before the award of an operating grant. 
Obviously, most cities never even went as far as applying for the 
feasibility study. 
58. For an analysis of this process in organizations, see 
Thompson, Organizations in Action (1967). 
59. For descriptions of conflict over school matters in two 
cities, see Resnick, Turning on the System, supra note 21; and 
Berube and Gittell (eds.), Confrontation at Ocean Hill-Brown-
sville (1969). 
60. Some school boards, Philadelphia's for example, have 
regularly televised special meetings concerned with the selection 
of a new superintendent. 
61. Walton, Interpersonal Peacemaking: Confrontations and 
Third Party Consultation (1969). 
62. CSPP memorandum on problems of field activities. For a 
brief description of the frustrations of one parent active in the 
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